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In this paper I analyze David Kaplan’s essay “Opacity”. In “Opacity” Kaplan attempts to
dismiss Quine’s concerns about quantiﬁcation across intensional (modal and intentional)
operators. I argue that Kaplan succeeds in showing that quantiﬁcation across intensional
operators is logically coherent and that quantiﬁed modal logic is strictly speaking not
committed to essentialism. However, I also argue that this is not in and of itself suﬃcient
to support Kaplan’s more ambitious attempt to move beyond purely logical results and
provide uniﬁed, uncontroversial interpretations of both “believes” and “necessarily”. In the
paper I raise several questions about the subject matter of logic and the role of semantics,
with special focus on singular propositions.
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1. Introduction
In 1943 Quine published his seminal paper “Notes on Existence and Necessity” where for the ﬁrst time he dealt ex-
tensively with what he dubbed “the question of admission or exclusion of the modalities . . . as operators attaching to
statements”.1 From Quine’s “Notes” David Kaplan’s “Opacity” takes inspiration.
Despite the development in the late ﬁfties of the possible-world model-theoretic semantics2 – which makes many say
that Quine’s concerns about modal logic have been answered – throughout his career, Quine persisted in his skepticism.
David Kaplan’s essay “Opacity” can be read as an attempt to go where the model theory cannot reach, to get at the deep
roots of Quine’s qualms and eradicate them.
In “Opacity” Kaplan individuates two reasons for Quine’s skeptical attitude towards modal operators. The ﬁrst, logical and
general, concerns all opacity inducing operators; the second, speciﬁc and metaphysical, concerns necessity. Quine’s general
logical and speciﬁc metaphysical charges relate to what Quine dubbed “the third grade of modal involvement”.
Kaplan conjectures that at the time of “Notes on Existence and Necessity” Quine was operating at the general, logical
level. His skepticism toward modality was sustained by an implicit argument meant to prove the inconsistency of quantiﬁca-
tion across any opacity producing operator. In subsequent work,3 Quine instead presented a metaphysical charge speciﬁcally
directed against modal operators: Commitment to Aristotelian Essentialism.
In [18] (“Three Grades of Modal Involvement”, 1953) Quine famously distinguished three different grades of involvement
with modal notions. At the ﬁrst grade of involvement, we only allow for a meta-linguistic predicate of necessity that ap-
plies to names of sentences. At the second grade, we make use of an object-language necessity operator modifying closed
sentences, as, e.g., in propositional modal logic when we write “1p”. Finally, coming to the third grade, in the context of
* Tel.: +1 604 822 6548; fax: +1 604 822 8782.
E-mail address: rballari@mail.ubc.ca.
1 [15, p. 113].
2 See [3–5] for the initial development of modal logic, and [9,10,13,14] for its early model theory.
3 See [17] and [18].1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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modal operator – ‘quantifying in’ – e.g., “(∃x)1Fx”, is syntactically well formed.4
In “Opacity” [12], Kaplan’s reconstruction of Quine’s logical and metaphysical criticisms encompasses the two following
claims:
The Logical Charge Quantiﬁcation across an operator is logically coherent only if the operator produces a non-opaque con-
text, viz., one that allows the intersubstitution salva veritate of co-referential singular terms.
The Metaphysical Charge Quantiﬁed modal logic is committed to essentialism, viz., there is no semantics for quantiﬁed modal
logic free of commitment to essentialist truths.
In this paper I do not raise the question whether these two charges adequately capture Quine’s interpretive concerns with
the modalities. I have argued elsewhere on Quine’s behalf that there are further interpretational concerns not captured by
Kaplan’s formulation of the problem.5 Presently, my aim is to explore what Kaplan’s arguments against Quine’s two charges
achieve. In so doing we will raise several questions about the subject matter of logic and the role of semantics, with special
focus on singular propositions. My conclusion will be that Kaplan succeeds in answering the two charges. He shows that
quantiﬁcation across modal operators is logically coherent and that quantiﬁed modal logic is not logically committed to
essentialism. However, I will argue that this is not in and of itself suﬃcient to support Kaplan’s more ambitious attempt to
move beyond purely logical results and provide uniﬁed, uncontroversial interpretations of both belief and necessity.
2. The logical charge dismissed
According to The Logical Charge, quantiﬁcation across an opaque operator is incoherent. (For brevity’s sake, I call
“opaque” any operator that produces an opaque context, viz., a context that does not allow the intersubstitution salva
veritate of co-referential singular terms.) Kaplan reconstructs on Quine’s behalf a theorem aimed at proving that a position
not open to substitution cannot be occupied by a variable bound to an initial quantiﬁer, external to the opacity inducing
operator. Kaplan conjectures that some such logical result must be at work behind Quine’s thesis in [15] linking failure of
substitutivity to incoherence of quantiﬁcation in. However, the theorem is fallacious. If the alleged theorem is its ground,
Quine’s Logical Charge rests on a fallacy.
According to Kaplan, Quine reasoned as follows. Let “F__” be an opaque context and “a” and “b” co-referential terms.
Assume that “Fa” and “Fb” differ in truth-value. It follows that the occurrences of “a” and “b”, in “Fa” and “Fb” respectively,
are non-purely referential. Consider then “Fx”, with “x” a variable whose value is the referent of “a” and “b”. Given the
difference in truth values between “Fa” and “Fb”, “Fx” under such an assignment must differ in truth value from one of
them. Let it differ in truth value from “Fb”. Then, the occurrence of “x” in “Fx” is also non-purely referential; hence, not
bindable.
The fault, claims Kaplan, lies with the assumption that whenever there is a difference in truth-value between “Ft1” and
“Ft2”, where “t1” and “t2” are co-referential, then neither term occurs purely referentially. Instead, all that can be inferred
is that at least, and possibly at most, one of the two terms does not occur purely referentially. But then, the occurrence of
“x” in “Fx” can still be purely referential and so bindable, despite its position in an opaque context.
Kaplan claims that if Quine is not following the above theorem in deriving the non-pure referentiality of all the singular
terms occurring in an opaque context from the sheer opacity of the context, then he must be subscribing to the great
classical tradition of Fregean semantics, according to which failure of substitutivity occurs independently from the nature of
the substituted terms.
Under the Fregean hypothesis, Quine commits no fallacy. Nonetheless, in such a case, he remains insensitive to the po-
tential different semantic behavior between distinct singular terms in the same context. In a Fregean perspective, contextual
opacity in and of itself is seen as suﬃcient to bar quantiﬁcation in, independently of how terms, and variables in particular,
function. The mistake in this case does not so much reside in positing a non-existent linkage between opacity and the
non-referential occurrences of terms, but rather in disregarding potential semantic differences between terms in the same
context.6 Kaplan points out that once the semantic characteristics of distinct terms are considered, it can be seen that the
same context need not affect all terms in the same way, and that its affecting some terms is enough to explain failure of
substitutivity, while its affecting all terms, or at least all variables, is needed to conjecture incoherence of quantiﬁcation in.
In his reply to “Opacity” [22], Quine rejects the charge of commitment to the fallacious theorem, and seems to admit to
Fregeanism when he says that he has been “position-minded all along”.7 He did not think of opacity in terms of occurrences
of terms, but simply in terms of the position in which they occurred.
4 Cf. [18, pp. 156–157].
5 See [1].
6 In “Quantifying In” [11], Kaplan contrasted Quine’s ‘defeatist’ with Frege’s ‘sanguine’ view of occurrences of terms in opaque contexts. That old contrast
is not given up by the present assimilation. Inside a generally Fregean framework, according to which context alone determines the behavior of the
occurring terms, there is space for sanguine reactions and defeatist attitudes in facing the challenge posed by the ill-behaved operators.
7 [22, p. 291].
252 R. Ballarin / Journal of Applied Logic 10 (2012) 250–259Whether Fregean or not in its motivation, Quine’s focus is on the opaque context itself and how it seems to make quan-
tiﬁcation in incoherent. We may read into this attitude an interest in the proper interpretation of the operators generating
opaque contexts. Quine’s concern is that, interpreted in a certain way, a belief or necessity context is both opaque and closed
to quantiﬁcation in.8 In such a scenario, Quine’s ban on quantiﬁcation in is led not so much by a logical argument, but by
some general interpretational hypothesis.
Kaplan’s interest lies instead in the technical coherence of a context that disallows substitutivity while at the same time
admitting quantiﬁcation in. To this end, it becomes crucial to prove not only that the alleged theorem is fallacious, but also
that its conclusion is false. What is to be explained is why the coherence of quantiﬁcation across an operator is independent
of the question of the substitutivity salva veritate of singular terms in the operator’s scope.
Latching on to another grand semantic tradition, Kaplan moves on to impute failure of substitutivity to terms, rather
than contexts alone. The gestalt-switch from contextual position to speciﬁc occurrences of terms opens up the possibility
that different kinds of terms behave differently in the same linguistic environment.
Making use of what he sees as the key feature of Russellian semantics, singular propositions (or their linguistic counter-
parts, valuated sentences), Kaplan argues for the technical feasibility of quantiﬁcation into opaque contexts. Just as singular
propositions are made up of intensional entities and plain objects, valuated sentences contain words and plain objects. If the
sentence “Fa” expresses a singular proposition, then the corresponding valuated sentence is like “Fa”, except that it contains
the object a in place of the term “a”. Alternatively, we may think of the valuated sentence as the singular proposition that
Fa, except that it contains the linguistic predicate “F ” in place of the intensional attribute F (keeping in mind that the same
singular proposition may correspond to more than one valuated sentence, if different predicates express the same attribute).
Valuated sentences serve the purpose of showing that Quine can be rebutted with no employment of suspicious intensional
entities. Kaplan claims that despite the apparent sensitivity of opaque contexts to something other than just the referents
of singular terms, all that matters for quantiﬁcation – even across an opaque operator – are the terms’ referents.
It is perhaps tempting to look at these matters in the following way: We ﬁrst distinguish with Russell, pace Frege,
between directly referential and non-directly referential singular terms; then we conjecture that in opaque contexts sub-
stitutivity fails for the non-directly referential terms, given the contexts’ sensitivity to the way in which the referent is
provided. However, directly referential terms have no way of providing a referent for these contexts to detect. Hence, they
behave there the way they always do: they just contribute an object to the proposition expressed. Being (the paradigm
of) directly referential terms, variables under an assignment of values simply refer to their assignments.9 This is enough to
secure both that directly referential terms can be bound to an external quantiﬁer, and that they can be substituted salva
veritate.
This picture however cannot be correct. Substitutivity salva veritate may, and indeed does, fail in some opaque contexts
for directly referential terms, indeed for variables too. For example, it may be held that Ralph may believe that Ortcutt is a
spy, without also believing that Bernard is a spy, despite the direct co-referentiality of “Bernard” and “Ortcutt”. Someone may
say “Fx” without saying “Fy”. Between quotes, even variables cannot be freely interchanged. Hence, the sweeping suggestion
that Russellian directly referential terms can only occur purely referentially seems wrong.
The best course for Kaplan is to appeal to singular propositions, with no need to sort out which kinds of terms, if any,
contribute to their expression. According to Kaplan, the key feature of Russellian semantics consists in envisioning singular
propositions, not in classifying terms one way or the other. This means that questions concerning the interchangeability of
co-referential terms are to be kept apart from questions of quantiﬁcation. The coherence of quantifying across an operator is
independent of the question of substitutivity salva veritate of singular terms in the operator’s scope. Failure of substitutivity
depends on terms. Quantiﬁcation in is enabled by the sheer metaphysical availability of singular propositions. The appeal
to singular propositions is suﬃcient to prove that the conclusion of the theorem, according to which a variable in a context
closed to substitution is not bindable, is false. Quine’s (alleged) Logical Charge is thereby dismissed.
3. The uniﬁed interpretation
After dismissing Quine’s Logical Charge, Kaplan makes a general interpretive proposal according to which uniﬁed, un-
ambiguous readings of opaque operators are sustainable despite the coherence of quantiﬁcation in and the failure of
substitutivity. Kaplan’s positive general interpretive conjecture is as follows:
The Uniﬁed Interpretation Thesis Given that quantiﬁcation across opaque operators is coherent, we need not assume that
opaque operators are lexically ambiguous. Singular propositions can be employed in the provision of a uniﬁed
interpretation.
Because of his strictures against quantifying in, Quine famously distinguished between two different interpretations of
opaque operators: notional and relational.10 (Not all opaque operators have the double reading, for example Quine never
envisioned a relational sense of quotation.)
8 I follow Kaplan in focusing just on belief. However, my remarks are meant to apply to the so-called “propositional attitudes” in general.
9 Cf. [12, pp. 235–236] where this kind of picture is suggested.
10 See especially [19] for belief, and [21] for necessity.
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hand, relationally interpreted, an operator is fully transparent: it allows both substitutivity and quantiﬁcation in.
In the notional sense, an intentional operator11 expresses a dyadic relation that holds between a subject and a propo-
sition (or a sentence); in the relational sense instead it expresses a multiple (at least triadic) relation between a subject,
an object of the attitude, and what is ‘attitudinized’ of it. For instance, in the notional sense, propositions or sentences are
the objects of belief; in the relational sense, a predicate or property is believed of something, i.e. something is believed to
be such and such. Similarly for necessity: in the notional sense, necessity is attributed to propositions or sentences; in the
relational sense, it is a way of relating objects to attributes or predicates.
Against Quine’s postulated ambiguity, Kaplan strives to provide a uniﬁed interpretation. As he points out, technically the
result is easily obtained by just allowing re-ambiguation of the alleged ambiguous operators. If there really are two senses
of necessity or belief, we can use one word to express both, as we have always done so far. We can then disambiguate the
re-ambiguated operator according to whether substitutivity and quantiﬁcation in are both allowed or both rejected.
Yet Kaplan acknowledges that if what we want to achieve is real uniﬁcation, not just re-ambiguation, we need semantic
uniﬁcation and not just “syntactic reorganization”. We aim at one uniﬁed notion of necessity (and belief) that genuinely
allows for quantiﬁcation in despite failure of substitutivity.
It is thanks to singular propositions that Kaplan rejects Quine’s distinction of the notional and the relational. Kaplan
has no sympathy for lexical ambiguities, when we can do without them, thanks to logical acumen and the new Russellian
entities. He claims that (i) there is only one sense of necessity or belief, (ii) it makes sense to quantify across a necessity or
belief operator, and (iii) it is nonetheless still the case that substitutivity may fail because of how the terms to be substituted
function.
The appeal to singular propositions allows Kaplan to posit no syntactical difference between the alleged relational and
notional senses of the operators. They always express relations to propositions or sentences. “Necessarily”, for example,
can always be taken as a sentential operator, and never as an adverb (predicate-modiﬁer). To achieve semantic uniﬁcation,
Kaplan needs to impute Quine’s alleged lexical distinction between notional and relational readings of the operators to a
difference in the propositions they operate upon. Kaplan uses the distinction between general and singular propositions to
explain the intuitive distinction that Quine thought called for a lexical ambiguity.
In this way, the superﬁcial syntactical uniformity is accompanied by deep semantical uniﬁcation. There is no lexical am-
biguity: only one monadic sense of “necessarily” and only one dyadic sense of “believes” that take both general and singular
propositions as their objects. For example, Quine’s notional beliefs have general propositions as their objects. Quine’s rela-
tional beliefs instead are beliefs in singular propositions. Similarly for necessity; and insofar as the new entities, singular
propositions, are uniﬁed with general propositions, a genuinely uniﬁed interpretation has been achieved.
3.1. The metaphysics of belief
The question we must consider is then the following: Are singular propositions really one of a kind with their general
counterparts? To address this question, let us ﬁrst consider Quine’s understanding of the relational interpretation of the
opaque operators, particularly belief.
Concerning the Quinean relational interpretation of belief, it must be noticed that it corresponds to Russell’s thesis in
The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [24] that intensional operators do not take propositions as their objects. Russell’s question
is “What is the form of the fact which occurs when a person has a belief?”12 For Russell this is a logical question, insofar
as logic “is concerned with the forms of facts, with getting hold of the different sorts of facts, different logical sorts of facts,
that there are in the world”.13 The thesis then is ultimately metaphysical, as Russell himself says when he points out that he
pursues logic “[i]n accordance with the sort of realistic bias that I should put into all study of metaphysics.”14 The question
then is about the metaphysics of belief and in particular the proper object of belief: “I am talking of the actual occurrence
of a belief in a particular person’s mind at a particular moment, and discussing what sort of a fact that is.”15
At the time of [24] Russell does not believe in the existence of propositions, whether general or singular, in addition to
facts. He also does not believe in the existence of false facts. So he claims that the objects of belief are neither propositions
(there aren’t any!), nor facts, because false beliefs would then have no object at all and we must provide a uniﬁed account of
belief independently from the truth or falsity of what is believed. Thus, when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio,
Othello is not related to some metaphysical unity comprising Desdemona, ‘loves’, and Cassio all together. He is related to
the three of them separately taken.16
When Quine distinguishes notional from relational beliefs he seems to have in mind the Russellian 1918 view of belief
as relational and the Fregean view as notional. According to Frege, beliefs are relations to thoughts, and Fregean thoughts
11 Intentional operators express psychological attitudes and are one kind of intensional operator.
12 [24, p. 81].
13 [24, p. 80].
14 [24, p. 80].
15 [24, pp. 80–81].
16 ‘Loves’ rather than love, because Russell emphasizes that the subordinate verb contributes to the belief something of quite a different, i.e. predicative,
nature from Desdemona and Cassio.
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in reality there are these two different sorts of beliefs. He is simply pointing out that there are two distinct views on the
metaphysics of belief and that they have opposite semantic consequences.
Notice moreover that two key features distinguish the notional from the relational account, and that these features
need not go hand in hand. The ﬁrst concerns the unity or lack thereof of what is believed. The second concerns the
representational nature of beliefs. According to Frege, thoughts are the objects of belief, and they are both real unities and
representational entities.17 Instead, according to Russell’s [24], the objects of belief are neither representational nor uniﬁed.
Clearly, when Kaplan proposes that the relational be treated on the model of the notional with a singular proposition
as its object he is proposing a very different view from Russell’s and Quine’s. He is in effect advocating the thesis that the
proper object of belief be both unitary and representational:
Quine saw how Frege’s intensional ontology . . . explained opacity and rejected quantiﬁcation. He also showed us how the
familiar ontology of linguistic expressions can do the same. I have aimed to describe modiﬁcations to the two ontologies
which allow them to accept (and even to explain) quantiﬁcation while leaving intact the prior explanation of opacity.
Each modiﬁcation involves two steps of uniﬁcation: ﬁrst, the uniﬁcation of individual and property (or predicate) by
enlisting, or creating, a new kind of entity containing individuals, and second, the assimilation of the new entities to the
old. The success of my project – to achieve conceptual coherence – depends on the degree to which each step seems natural.18
Whether intensional (singular propositions) or linguistic (valuated sentences), the objects of relational beliefs are to
possess a real unity between the subject and the predicate. This requirement falls squarely within the Fregean tradition
of searching for a real unity of thought.19 Paradoxically, Kaplan uses Russellian propositions to ﬁght against the Russellian
multi-relational view of belief, and to extend the Fregean treatment to the singular case.
Additionally, the uniﬁcation between general and singular propositions must also be natural. But then the new entities
must be representational too, if the old ones are. Either general and singular propositions are both fact-like entities, for
example states of affairs, in a genuine Russellian spirit, in which case neither is representational; or they are both thought-
like entities in a Fregean spirit according to which intensional entities are fundamentally representational. I conjecture that
in Kaplan’s view all propositions are fundamentally representational, given that they are meant to serve the same purpose
of their verbal counterparts, valuated sentences.20
I see Kaplan’s project as subject to a tension. At this juncture, we face a dilemma. Suppose we grant the aﬃnity of
singular and general propositions. Then Kaplan has indeed achieved a uniﬁed interpretation. However, he has achieved
it by reducing Quine’s original relational interpretation to a limit case of the notional. Kaplan’s view in “Opacity” [12]
is not substantially different from his previous view in “Quantifying In” [11]. In [11] he accounted for the de re, that is
the relational, by appealing to a special subclass of expressions which are intersubstitutable salva veritate even in opaque
contexts. He had then made recourse to standard names, like numerals for numbers, to explain relational necessity, and to
vivid names to express relational belief.21 He is now moving beyond names thanks to singular propositions.
There are some differences, of course. At the time of “Quantifying In”, standard names were seen both as providing a way
of understanding de re necessity, but also as automatically making true some essentialist claims concerning those entities
that have standard names. Now, with directly referential names in place of standard ones to effect the reduction of the de
re to the de dicto, we get a way of understanding essentialist claims which does not commit us to any particular extension
of essentialist truths. Nine qua “nine” was necessarily the successor of eight, because of the properties of numerals; but nine
qua itself – discharging the duty of self-representation in a singular proposition – leaves space open to settle the question
any way desired.
But if propositions are ultimately representational entities, any account of opaque verbs and operators that takes them
as their objects is notional. If this is the case, Kaplan’s use of singular propositions provides indeed a uniﬁed account, but
not of the right phenomena and, in so doing, it obscures the distinctive features of the relational.
According to the other horn of the dilemma, we may question the adequacy of singular propositions as (i) real unities and
(ii) representational entities. Hence, we may grant to Kaplan that the readings he aspires to unify are indeed the intended
Quinean ones. However, if all that the unity of a singular proposition amounts to is some form of set-theoretic unity, as
when we think of singular propositions as mathematical sequences, we are far away from the real uniﬁcation that genuine
facts and thoughts require. Moreover, if the plain objects in singular propositions are unable to discharge representational
duties, the semantic uniﬁcation of the relational with the notional remains a logician’s trick with no intuitive, conceptual
support. As Quine points out, singular propositions as sequences of entities are ontologically unobjectionable. Of a kind with
the traditional, general, representational propositions however they are not.
17 See [6].
18 [12, p. 285], emphasis mine.
19 But see also Russell, “A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity . . . no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition” [23, p. 50].
20 Moreover, in later still unpublished work Kaplan has coined the slogan “No mentation without representation” to voice the requirement that the objects
of thought be representational entities.
21 I trust that my general point is clear enough for the purpose at hand, with no need to elaborate on standard and vivid names.
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the two interpretations, valuated sentences (sentences containing non-linguistic objects as well as words) must be just that:
sentences. Even if in some new and stretched sense, they must still be linguistic entities. Kaplan tells us that not all parts of
sentences need be words. The ontology of sentences has been expanded to include valuated sentences, however something
must be preserved to assimilate the new entities to the traditional ones. A plausible suggestion is that the non-linguistic
object in the sentence (the value) is there to discharge the duty of self-representation. But then the object in the sentence is
there in place of itself rather than being simply present. It is used rather than mentioned.
If, on the other hand, valuated sentences are too hard a dictum to digest and the relational remains free of represen-
tational features, as Russell and Quine meant it to be, then no uniﬁcation has been achieved. The non-linguistic object in
the sentence has no representational powers and Kaplan’s new sentences are fundamentally different from traditional ones.
Valuated sentences are of a different kind from ordinary sentences, and in some perhaps parochial but surely defensible
sense, not sentences at all. I think this last might have been Quine’s opinion:
[T]he resulting analysis does not strike me as more natural than what was afforded by Kaplan’s old footnote and “Inten-
sions Revisited.” Perhaps its added virtue lies rather in accommodating unspeciﬁable objects.22
Let me now raise a parenthetical question. If we endorse Kaplan’s open-minded ontology of sentences, what prevents
us from stretching the notion of sentence to the point of envisioning sentences containing no linguistic components at all?
Lacking a principled reason to stop this move – some justiﬁed, non-ad hoc stricture demanding the presence of at least one
old-fashioned piece of vocabulary for an entity to count as a sentence – what stops us from calling any old fact a sentence?
But then aren’t we just equivocating? Or are we rather introducing a new (quasi-)symbolic system?
To conclude, if singular propositions are assimilated to general propositions they help provide a uniﬁed account, but
of two sides of the same phenomenon, we might call them “the singular notional” and “the general notional”. If instead
singular propositions are assimilated to the relational, this way of representing the relational (‘sub specie propositionis’, so to
speak) represents a logician’s trick, a clever superﬁcial uniﬁcation of what is at heart disparate.
3.2. The role of semantics
We have seen that Russell’s project was metaphysical: to ﬁgure out the logical structure of facts of belief. However it
is not clear that Kaplan’s project is of the same sort. This emerges in part XI of [12] which is devoted to methodology.
Kaplan gives reasons to reject the syntactic transformation of sentential operators into predicates and of their sentential
complements into names (of propositions). He says,
To the degree to which we regard our semantical methods as model-making (i.e., as a way of analyzing the notion of
logical consequence for the object language) rather than as reality-describing (i.e., as analyzing the intended interpreta-
tion), ﬁne-tuning the object language to bring it into conformity with our model may end up institutionalizing an artifact
of the model that corresponds to no aspect of reality . . . Model-making, by helping to articulate structure, can help to
make it more acceptable that there is a reality behind questioned linguistic forms. (For example, that there is relational
belief or even that there are singular propositions.) But one can accept the linguistic forms and the logic induced by
the model, without thinking that there must be ‘hidden’ aspects of the reality that correspond to unexpressed structural
features of the model. In particular, the very ontology of the model, whether propositions, possible worlds, or [valuated
sentences], need not mirror any aspect of the reality expressed . . . 23
Kaplan’s methodological sermon places his semantical project as distant as possible from both Frege’s and Russell’s. To the
degree to which Kaplan regards his semantical project as model-making, his aim is simply to show that “quantiﬁcation into
opacity” is not strictly speaking incoherent. As artifacts of the model, propositions – singular as well as general – need not
be taken with any great metaphysical seriousness. The logical coherence of “quantiﬁcation into opacity” that Kaplan defends
has nothing to do with the reality of facts of belief or necessity. We are very far from Russell’s understanding of logic as a
branch of metaphysics concerned with the real structure of actual facts, like your present belief that today is Tuesday.
It must be acknowledged that by means of singular propositions, whether real or simple model-theoretic artifacts, Kaplan
has surely secured his logical point: quantiﬁcation into opaque contexts is not incoherent. The answer to this question how-
ever does not depend on whether singular propositions (i) possess real internal unity or are just mathematical sequences,
and (ii) are really similar to general propositions. Artiﬁcially or naturally, the technical result is secured. But insofar as Ka-
plan is attempting to move beyond semantics as model-making to semantics as the provision of the intended interpretation,
we need only remember his own words: “The success of my project – to achieve conceptual coherence – depends on the
degree to which each step [of uniﬁcation] seems natural”.
22 [22, p. 292].
23 [12, p. 246].
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After the rebuttal of the Logical Charge, Kaplan moves on to defuse Quine’s Metaphysical Charge, according to which
quantiﬁed modal logic is committed to essentialism, i.e., to an invidious attitude towards the attributes of a thing, whereby
some are regarded as essential, others as accidental. Kaplan rebuts this second charge by showing that quantiﬁed modal
logic is at most committed to a benign, i.e., logical, form of essentialism which, roughly put, necessitates only logical
attributes. Kaplan extracts this benign notion of logical necessity from the models of ﬁrst-order logic (with identity and
descriptions). Bracketing aside questions of iteration of the modal operators, the task is to ﬁnd a way of classifying which
ﬁrst-order sentences (including valuated sentences) are (logically) necessary. Kaplan’s answer is: those that are true in all
the ﬁrst-order models, i.e., logically true.
By extension of the notion of logical truth from closed to open sentences, an open formula is logically true (under an
assignment of values to its variables) if it is true (under that assignment) in all models. But logical truth is not invidious: if
a formula is logically true under an assignment of values to its variables, it remains such under an isomorphic assignment.
This is Kaplan’s principle of the fungibility of individuals, which again refutes any essential predication of individuals, except
for the benign logical form of essentialism, e.g., that Socrates is necessarily self-identical or red-or-not-red.
From this kind of anti-essentialist ﬁrst-order model theory, Kaplan ‘reads off’ an interpretation of a logical necessity
operator “L ”. “ L ” embraces (the necessitation of) logical truths. Insofar as individuals are involved, the operator veriﬁes
only essentialist claims of the benign, non-invidious, kind, e.g., the above “Socrates is self-identical” and “Socrates is red-or-
not-red.”
Kaplan suggests that if Quine’s problem was invidious essentialism of the Aristotelian kind, then he should be happy
with the logical interpretation of necessity he offers. He conjectures that Quine may not have been aware of how to extend
the benign notion of logical truth (hence, logical necessity) to valuated sentences. This oversight made him misjudge quan-
tiﬁed modal logic as being committed to an abandonment of benign logical essentialism. Quine wrongly thought that no
logical criterion to distinguish between essential and accidental predications was forthcoming. Once again, singular propo-
sitions or valuated sentences serve Kaplan well in defusing Quine’s third-grade concerns. They were employed to legitimize
quantiﬁcation into opaque operators, and are now used to extend to open sentences a benign notion of logical necessity
that makes no use of linguistic surrogates.
Kaplan speculates that Quine wrongly conjectured that a de dicto translation of de re modal claims had to make use of
verbal or conceptual surrogates of objects, namely that we can only make sense of necessity as applied to objects under a
name or description, not directly. But in so doing, we inevitably introduce a distinction between terms that recapitulates
at the linguistic level the invidious Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental properties – something like a
distinction between essential and accidental names.24
Quine however had explicitly made it clear that this is not his concern when he addressed a similar remark of Kripke’s:
[T]his kind of consideration is not relevant to the problem of essentialism because one doesn’t ever need descriptions or
proper names. . . . The distinction between proper names and descriptions is a red herring. So are the tags.25
Rather than conjecturing with Kaplan that Quine is surrogate-minded, I claim on the contrary that Quine’s concern about
essentialism strikes exactly because no use of surrogates is assumed. The use of surrogates to make sense of the de re reduces
the de re to the de dicto and does not really provide the intended reading of the de re idioms. On the other hand, a real
de re interpretation of modal discourse makes no use of surrogates, and forces an attribution of modal properties directly
to objects. This is essentialism in Quine’s eyes (though it may still be benign in Kaplan’s sense of necessitating only logical
attributes). Thus, I conjecture that Kaplan and Quine use the term “Essentialism” in different senses. For Kaplan, Aristotelian
Essentialism is mainly a matter of extension: it consists in necessitating more than just logical attributes. For Quine instead,
Aristotelian Essentialism consists in accepting a direct modal attribution of predicates to objects, no matter how logical or
pure the predicates being attributed are.
Kaplan shows the coherence of his own logical interpretation of the modal operators, and demonstrates how to extend
this logical interpretation of necessity to quantiﬁed modal discourse by extending the notion of logical truth to open formu-
las under an assignment of values, that is to valuated sentences. In so doing, Kaplan claims to have cleared the third grade
of modal involvement of the charge of invidious essentialism.
I take Quine to have recognized the compatibility of the logical reading of the modal operators and quantiﬁcation in.
Quine however suggests that, despite its consistency and benignity, the logical interpretation of necessity is not the intended
one:
We turn then to essentialism. I accept the notion of logical truth, as Kaplan observes. I accept it in an epistemologically
innocent way, on a par with chemical truth, economic truth, and ornithological truth; it is merely a question in each
case of what expressions occur essentially rather that vacuously. When we modalize logical truth into logical necessity by
24 K. Fine shares this interpretation in [7] and [8].
25 [20, p. 140].
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Kaplan urges, in that whatever is essential to one object is essential to all. There is no gainsaying its benignity, as
essentialism goes. The same could be said of a modal logic based not on logical necessity but on its chemical, economic,
or ornithological analogue. Most of the interest that modal logic has commanded, however, hinges rather on a notion of
metaphysical necessity . . . and this course is committed to invidious essentialism, as Kaplan calls it, in which an essential
trait of one object can be an accident of another. Moreover, it is this pattern, rather than the benign one, that I see as
useful and customary in daily discourse, though only meaningful in context.26
Whether Quine is right or not about the intended extension of true essential predications, a deeper problem needs to be
addressed. The question is whether the intended interpretation of a sentence like “Socrates is necessarily human” or even
“Socrates is necessarily red or not red” is that the singular proposition that Socrates is red or not red is necessarily true. If
the intended interpretation of de re (i.e., relational) modal idioms is instead multi-grade, as in the case of belief, we need to
make sense of the notion of a property applying essentially to an object. The fact that the property selected is logical, like
‘red or not red’, is not in and of itself suﬃcient to make sense of the notion of essential, or even logical, predication.
5. Logical truth and logical satisfaction
As seen, Kaplan’s speciﬁc positive proposal consists in putting forward a non-essentialist, logical reading of the modal
operators and arguing for its compatibility with quantiﬁed modal discourse. This is Kaplan’s positive conjecture:
The Logical Necessity Thesis Quantiﬁed modal logic is consistent with a logical, non-essentialist interpretation. To provide
such an interpretation, it is suﬃcient to make sense of logical truth for singular propositions.
Quine’s third-grade concerns regard the interpretation of quantiﬁed in modal sentences, under the standard objectual
interpretation of the quantiﬁers and a semantical interpretation of the modal operators – interpreted as representing at the
object level some meta-linguistic property of sentences. Quine thought it nonsensical to say of an object that, independently
of any characterization, it bears a property analytically.27 Kaplan has shifted the debate from analyticity to logical truth.
Thus, the question to be addressed becomes whether is makes sense to say of an object that it bears a property logically.
In other words, does the clarity of the notion of logical truth guarantee the clarity of a corresponding notion of logical
predication?
Roughly speaking, Kaplan interprets the idea of an object being logically F in terms of the object’s logically satisfying
F , and this last is understood in terms of the logical truth of the singular proposition containing the object itself and the
property F . Additionally, to make sense of the logical truth of singular propositions or valuated sentences, Kaplan relies on
ﬁnding a corresponding general, closed sentence that is logically true just in case the valuated sentence is.28 In so doing, I
will argue, the notion of logical predication is explained away (reduced to some other notion), rather than explained.
An analogy with Kaplan’s operator Says-quote will help to clarify my concern. Kaplan considers the possibility of intro-
ducing an operator Says-quote to replace the predicate “says” of direct discourse. According to the proposal, the quotes of
direct discourse are incorporated into the operator. This transforms
(i) Ralph says “Ortcutt is no spy”
into
(ii) Ralph says-quote Ortcutt is no spy.29
Once the quotes have been incorporated into the operator, we may be tempted to quantify in and thus produce
(iii) (∃x) Ralph says-quote x is a spy.
According to Kaplan, the reasonable view on such an operator maintains that no valuated sentence falls into its extension,
i.e., it regards (iii) and its kin as always false, despite their “model-theoretic intelligibility.”30
In the case of the operator of logical necessity, a similar point holds. In that case, Kaplan concedes that some valuated
sentences do indeed fall into the extension of the operator, e.g. “OBJECT is red or not red”, however the operator would be
equally (model-theoretically) intelligible even if no valuated sentence fell into its extension and, in general, no matter what
its extension might be.
26 [22, p. 292].
27 See Quine [15] and [16], also Ballarin [2].
28 Cf. [12, p. 251].
29 Cf. [12, pp. 247–248].
30 [12, p. 247].
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ligibility. Granted its clear model-theoretic semantics, can we really make sense of “(∃x) Ralph says-quote x is a spy”? It
seems to me that, its clear model-theoretic semantics notwithstanding, no natural understanding of “(∃x) Ralph says-quote
x is a spy” is forthcoming. To judge with Kaplan that no valuated sentence can ever be said is not enough to make sense of
what saying such a sentence could possibly consist in. Of course, we can stipulate that “(∃x) Ralph says-quote x is a spy”
is true just in case there is a term “a” such that “Ralph says-quote a is a spy” is true, that is just in case “Ralph says ‘a is a
spy”’ is true. This reduction however offers no relational interpretation of says-quote.
I suggest that Quine’s view about the logical operator of necessity may well be similar to my view of Says-quote.
We can surely provide a clear model-theoretic semantics and settle the question of which singular propositions fall in its
extension, nonetheless no clear, non-reductive sense has been made of quantiﬁcation across it. Logical coherence falls short
of conceptual coherence.
To make sense of quantiﬁcation across Says-quote we need to explain what counts as Saying-quote of something that
it is so-and-so. Similarly, to explain how an object can bear a property of logical necessity we need to explain nothing less
than exactly this: how it can indeed bear a property in such a way. The proposal that it does so in case a certain singular
proposition is logically true doesn’t render the logical bearing of a property in and of itself intelligible. A non-reductive
explanation of logical predication has to explain what it is for an object to bear a property logically.
Similarly, as we have seen, the appeal to singular propositions in and of itself does nothing to explain the alleged
phenomenon of de re belief. Those who claim that Quine’s notion of de re belief makes no sense gain no insight on the
notion when told that to have a de re belief is to believe a singular proposition. The question instead becomes: What does it
mean to believe a singular proposition? An explanation of de re belief cannot escape the task of explaining what it means for
an object in and of itself, independently of any characterization, to be believed to be something or other. Any explanation
of the phenomenon ultimately appealing to beliefs in some corresponding general propositions would be fundamentally
reductive and de dicto.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed Kaplan’s reply to Quine’s qualms about quantiﬁcation into opaque contexts. In particular,
I have focused on Kaplan’s employment of singular propositions for this task. Kaplan uses singular propositions as a model-
theoretic tool to show that (i) quantiﬁcation across opaque operators is not incoherent and that (ii) we can endorse a logical
notion of necessity that necessitates only logical truths, including singular ones.
However, I have argued that if our interest lies in the intended interpretation of quantiﬁed in modal or intentional
idioms, the simple appeal to singular propositions is not suﬃcient to provide a uniﬁed interpretation of relational and
notional readings of opaque operators. This has emerged clearly in the case of belief, where it seems that there is nothing
in common between a notional account of belief according to which the proper objects of belief are single, uniﬁed thoughts,
namely general propositions understood as representational entities, on the one hand, and a relational account according to
which the objects of thought are neither internally uniﬁed nor representational, on the other.
Similarly, classifying singular propositions as necessary in case they are logically true (ultimately by taking properties
to be logical in case they apply universally) does indeed provide an extensionally non-controversial version of essentialism.
Nonetheless, I have argued that such a reading does not by itself qualify as a relational interpretation of the modal operators.
Relationally interpreted, necessity is a mode of predication, not of truth. A relational interpretation of logical necessity has
to make sense of the notion of logical predication.
My sense is that Kaplan’s philosophical temperament is very much at odds with Quine’s. When Quine pointed out some
trouble-making idioms, Kaplan immediately set out to ﬁnd a way to reduce the controversial to the non-controversial. He
did so in a genuine Carnapian, explanatory spirit. However, in this way Quine is impossible to please, because he is not
looking for a way out of the problem. For him, no light is thrown on a problem by showing how to sidestep it.
In conclusion, I would like to suggest that perhaps the deepest disagreement between Kaplan and Quine is on the
central task of semantics. Kaplan seems to conceive of it as a branch of logic, whose main task is “to analyz[e] the notion of
logical consequence for the object language.” Quine’s interest lies instead in the intended interpretation of our language. As
such, semantics cannot and should not be kept apart from metaphysics, given that, as Kaplan says, to analyze the intended
interpretation is to describe reality.
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